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CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE ENEMY PROPERTY
How long must an ancient belligerent practice have fallen into
disuse before it can be said to have become obsolete as a matter of law?
The English Court of Appeal in the recent case of Re EX-Czar of
Bulgaria's Property,' in holding that the Crown's prerogative "right"
of forfeiture of enemy private property in England was superseded
by the Trading with the Enemy Act, under which such property was
vested in the Public Trustee as custodian of enemy property, neverthe-
less decided that the common-law privilege of confiscating the private
property of enemy subjects had not been abrogated.
Possibly no single custom of war incidental to the advance of civili-
zation, since the time when war was the normal and peace the abnormal
relation between states, has been deemed more firmly rooted in law
and practice than the immunity from confiscation of the private
property on land of enemy subjects, not violated since the Napoleonic
(1920, C. A.) 123 L. T. R. 661.
[s45]
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wars. It was considered to have become as obsolete as the asportation
and enslavement of the enemy's women and children. Inasmuch as
custom and usage are among the most authoritative sources of inter-
national law, the writers had some justification for asserting that an
ancient barbarous practice, not employed for a century, had now been
replaced by the modern humane rule of immunity of private property
from confiscation. 2  During the recent war, several decisions of the
House of Lords and other high courts had held uniformly that it was
not the law that the property of enemy subjects was confiscated in
time of war.$
But since the Treaty of Peace has adopted provisions looking to the
confiscation of enemy private property sequestrated during the war,4
the English courts appear to have deemed it necessary to find some lega"justification for this revolutionary step; and they have done so by
reverting for authority to the Year Books, the dicta of numerous
'Wheaton, International Law (Phillipson's ed. I916) 417-422, 424-426; Halleck,
International Law (3d ed, 1893) ch.- 21, secs. 12-21; Hall, International Law
(6th ed. 1909) 431-435, (7th ed. 1917) 459-464; 20ppenheim, International Law(3d ed. 192o) sec. Io2; 2 .Westlake, International Law (I9IO) 36-44; 7 Moore,
Digest, sec. 1151, 1155; Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909) 39-49.
' See, e.g. Lord Finlay in Stevenson v. Akiiengesellschaft fiir Cartonnagenin-
dustrie [1918, H. L.] A. C. 239, 244: "It is not the law of this country that theproperty of enemy subjects is confiscated. Until the restoration of peace the
enemy can, of course, make no claim to have it delivered up .to him, but whenpeace is restored he is considered as entitled to his property with any fruits it
may have borne in the meantime." See also Lord Haldane in same case, id., 247;
Lord Parker in Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. [19161 2 A. C.307, 347; Lord Birkenhead in Fred Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Ocronera(0917) 88 L. J. Ch. 304, 309; Cardozo, J. in Techt v. Hughes (192o) 229 N. Y.
222, 128 N. . 185; L. Hand, J., in Stoehr v. Wallace (192o, S: D. N. Y.) 269
Fed. 827, 839.
'Art. 297, sec. (b): "Subject to any contrary stipulations which may beprovided for in the present Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the
right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests belonging . . . to
German nationals, or companies controlled by them, within their territories,
colonies, possessions and protectorates, including territories ceded to them by the
present Treaty."
France, Belgium and Japan appear to have availe4 themselves to the fullest
extent of this power. Great Britain has done so, with the exception of house-
hold effects to the value of £5oo, where the income of the German owner does
not exceed £4oo per year. (British-German Agreement of Dec. 31 1920.)
Germans resident in England can recover properfy to the value of £rooo ard
those formerly resident in England but now residing elsewhere, £2oo. Italy
has exempted from confiscation property to the value of 5o,ooo lire, and is
holding the rest in abeyance. Jugoslavia is also proceeding slowly, not havingfully determined her policy. Cuba and Guatemala seem to have returned the
sequestrated property to its owners, and possibly other Latin-American countries
hav'e pursued the same policy. The United States has not yet passed any Act of
Congress returning the property, although the Knox Resolution looks to such
return, conditional upon Germany satisfying the war claims of American citizens
against her.
COMMENTS
decisions, and the references of writers to the old and abandoned
practice, distinguishing away on unconvincing grounds the square
decision to the contrary of Lord Ellenborough in 1817 in Wolff v.
Oxholm,5 to the effect that a Danish ordinance confiscating a debt owed
by a Danish to a British subject was invalid as a defense to a claim
made by the British subject after the war, as it was contrary to ,the
law of nations.
Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel, writing in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, while recognizing the existence of the practice of
confiscation, condemned it.6 Marshall, as early as 1814, in the famous
case of Brown v. United States,7 while recognizing the physical power
and the practice of confiscation in the past, said that "according to
modern usage," private property of the enemy found in the national
territory "ought not to be confiscated." He added that "this usage
" . . . cannot be disregarded by [the sovereign] without obloquy."
Justice Wilson in Ware v. Hylton,8 said: "By every nation, whatever
"its form of government, confiscation of debts has long been considered
"disreputable." Debts, of course, are merely one form of property.
Clifford, J., in Hanger v. Abbott9 called confiscation "a naked and
"impolitic right, condemned by the enlightened conscience and judg-
"ment of modern times."' 0
Far from legalizing the practice of confiscation, these cases indicate
that the practice, whenever exercised, was deemed contrary to the
modern rule of law, which, by usage, and by' the desuetude and
universal condemnation of the ancient practice, had become the existing
law of nations.
That it was not the intention of Congress to confiscate the German
private property found in the United States on the outbreak of the
recent war appears clearly from the congressional debates and reports
of committees."' The Trading with the Enemy Act of Oct. 6, 1917,12
'(1817, K. B.) 6 M. & S. 92. But see the dictum of Dr. Lushington in The
Johanna Emilie (1864, Adm.) Spink, 14.
'See citations in Hamilton's Camillus Letters XIX, in defense of article io of
the Jay Treaty with Great -Britain of 1794, 5 Hamilton's Works, and Wheaton,
op. cit. note 2 supra, at pp. 417-419. Story in his dissenting opinion in Brown v.
United States (1814, U. S.) 8 Cranch 110, 140, seeks to show that only Vattel
founal the practice illegal and that Grotius, Bynkershoek and others supported it.
8 Cranch, 110, 128.
(1796, U. S.) 3 Dallas, I98.
(1867, U. S.) 6 Wall. 532.
=o Dicta to the same effect are to be found in Briggs v. United States (1892)
143 U. S. 346, r2 Sup. Ct. 391; Young v. United States (1877) 97 U. S. 39, 6o;
Mrs. Alexanders' Cotton (1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 404, 419. See also i Kent,
Commentaries, 65, 73. The case of Miller v. United States (187o, U. S.) iI
Wall. 268 involved acts of forfeiture as a penalty for treason. Act of Aug. 6,
1861 (12 Stat. at L 319); Act of July, 16, 1862 (12 Stat. at L. 589).
" Cong. Record (65th Cong. ist sess.) 4844 ff. Sen. Rep. 113 (65th Cong. ist
sess.) ; H. R. Rep. 85 (65th Cong. ist sess.).
"Public, No. 91, 65th Cong.
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and the proclamations issued thereunder affirm that the Alien Property
Custodian is a "common-law trustee" only. Yet this suffices to enable
him to sell property.'8 Questions will arise, on the conclusion of peace
with Germany, whether further seizures can be effected, of property,
for example, for which a "demand" had been made by the Custodian
prior to July, 1919. It is intimated by judge Learned Hand in Stoehr
v. Wallace'4 that the "demand" divested the enemy's "rights" against
an American debtor, but this of course does not mean that the enemy's
"rights" as owner of the property are divested. Judge Hand said that
"the capture" settles nothing except "bare sequestration" or "posses-
sion." In an English case, decided since the Treaty of Versailles,'
5
it was held that the English Custodian was neither an agent nor trustee
of the enemy owner, and that the beneficial ownership of the property,
pending disposition by statute, was in a state of suspense. During the
war, it had been held to be in the enemy.'8 It would seem that after
peace, no further captures, even on outstanding demands, should be
made ;" indeed, there is strong authority for the view that any captures,
on land or sea, following the armistice are acts of hostility inconsistent
with an armistice and hence violative of international law.
In Stoehr v. Garvan 7 the Supreme Court held that article 23 of
the Treaty of 1799 with Prussia," providing that in case of war
"merchants of either country then residing in the other" shall be
allowed nine months within which to collect their debts and withdraw
their property, applies only to German merchants "residing" in the
United States, and not to non-residents. This seems too literal a
construction of the treaty, which was designed to protect the pre-war
property of German nationals, rather than the property of residents
only. As such treaties were common in the early nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court's interpretation would protect only such property
as the owner had physically followed, leaving his property in other
countries without protection. Story is charged by a recent English
writer 9 with a similar misconstruction of Magna Carta, whose pro-
tection Story thought extended only to domiciled foreign merchants.
The interpretation seems incompatible with the reason giving rise to
the rule and the treaty.
1 1The power of sale conferred by Act of March 28, 1918, Public, No. iog, 65th
Cong., does not appear to have been wisely used, for many sales of investments
were made at sacrifice prices, from which the country derived no benefit. The
only ones profiting were some American citizens who picked up bargains. The
whole matter of sales should be thoroughly investigated.
"Note 3, supra, at p. 834.
"Re Munster (192o, Ch.) 122 L. T. R 411.
" Stevenson v. Akt. fir Cartonnagen-Industrie, supra note 3.
(1921) 41 Sup. Ct. 293, 298
Revived by treaty of 1828, Art. 12, 8 Stat. at L. 174.
19F. E. Farrpr in (1921) 37 L QuAR. REV. 218, 226. Story's view is disclosed
in Brown v. United States (1814, U. S.) 8 Cranch, 11o, 144.
COMMENTS
The policy with respect to the German sequestrated property is to be
determined by Congress. The Knox Resolution makes its eventual
return to its owners conditional upon the satisfaction by Germany of
the claims of American citizens, but does not assure its return. Com-
mercial policy dictated the decadence of the old practice of confis-
cation.20 Thf like consideration is operative to-day, with greater force
than ever. Any confiscation of the property, in whole or in part, would
retard the development of the world's resources by imperilling foreign
investment, would promote armament by making the safety not
merely of public but of private property depend upon success in arms,
and would loosen one of the most fundamental of the props of the
existing economic and social structure, by undermining the security
of private property. A reversion to the obsolete practice of confisca-
tion is fraught with immeasurable danger to the supremacy of law.
E. M. B.
ACCELERATION OF REMAINDERS
The theory of acceleration proceeds upon the supposition that,
although the ulterior devise or grant is in terms not to take effect in
possession until the decease of the prior life tenant, yet, in point of
fact, it is to be read as a limitation of a remainder to take effect in every
event which removes the prior estate.' At common law a strict legal
remainder had to be supported by a valid particular freehold estate
and had to be so limited as to take effect eo instante on the termination
of the estate.2 The feudal system required some responsible person to
be available at all times to perform the feudal services which became
an inseparable adjunct to the seisin. Thus it followed necessarily
that the seisin had to be in some definite person. Consequently in a
feoffment to A for life remainder to B, if A was a monk incapable of
taking, B's remainder was bad,' as the law would not permit the seisin
to be in abeyance until A's death. But if a home for the seisin was
provided and it once passed from the grantor, as -in a case where the
first limitation is valid, an ulterior limitation following an intervening
void estate was saved by accelerating it upon the destruction of the
The original relaxation of the practice of confiscation was probably due to
the general conviction, of mutual advantage, that those surviving the devastating
effects of unmitigated war should have something with which to take up again
the thread of life.
11 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910) 71g. For an excellent discussion of accelera-
tion of remainders and a collection of common-law authority, see Farrar,
Acceleration of Remainders (I916) 32 L QuAR. REv. 392; Sweet, Acceleration
of "Future Interests (917) 61 Sor. JouR. 573, 588.
'i Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) secs. 135, 136; Gray, Perpetuities
(3d ed. 1915) sec. 8; Perkins, Conveyancing (xsth ed. 1792) sec. 568; I8 Vin.
Abr. tit. Remainder, c. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7.
'Preston, Estates (2d ed. 1828) sec. iig; Perkins, loc. cit; Tiffany, loc. cit;
Gray, loc cit.
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particular intermediate estate.' For example in a feoffment to A for
life, remainder to B for life, remainder to C in fee, where B's estate
is avoided, C's estate is accelerated on the termination of A's. How-
ever, if there was a person on hand to perform the feudal services, as
in the case of the determination of the particular estate by a re-entry
upon a condition affecting only the particular estate, the remainder
could depend upon the estate pur autre vie and was not accelerated.5
The effect of a disclaimer by the tenant of the particular estate is in
dispute, but it appears not to have made such estate void ab initio,
(providing the estate had once vested in the- disclaimor) so as to
defeat a remainder, although it caused no acceleration of it.6
The underlying purpose of the Statute of Wills, as well as of local
customs prior to it, was to enable the owner of land to give his property
to whom he desired, and so naturally the courts endeavored to give
effect to the intention of the testator. Therefore limitations in wills
were more liberally treated, and a remainder was accelerated where
the particular estate was void in its inception,7 or disclaimed, s or where
a void intervening particular estate followed a valid prior estate
which failed.9
'Perkins, op. cit., secs. 566; 1 Sheppard, Touchstone (ist Amer. ed. i8o8) sec.
435; Maud's Case (1333) Y. B. 7 Edw. IIP, p. 1g, pl. 24; Carrick v. Errington
(1726, Ch.) 2 P. Wins. 36. The limitations in the latter case were to A for
life, remainder to B, a papist, remainder to trustees for the life of B in trust to
let B take the profits, and to preserve the contingent remainders, remainder to
B's sons in tail male, remainder to C. A died and B could not take because of
the statute against the papists. The court held that the trustees estate was
accelerated but not that of C, and that the rents and profits should go to the
grantor's heirs during B's life or until he should have a protestant son. See
note 25 infra.
"Perkins, op. cit., sec. 565; 2 Co. Lit. 298a.
'Co. Lit. 298a. An estate could be forced surreptitiously upon a person, and
even though later disclaimed, it was sufficient to support a remainder. See 2
Coke, Institutes, 286; Statham Abr. (Klingersmith's ed. 1915) tit. Disclaymer
(so) ; Perkins, op. cit., secs. 44, 45. The question rarely arose at common law
as to the effect of a disclaimer, as the feoffee had to be present, and if at the
moment of enfeoffing he refused to take, no estate passed. On this ground, that
the disclaimor never had even an estate surreptitiously forced upon him, most
of the authority to the contrary can be distinguished. As to duties or liabilities
in the disclaimor, the disclaimer cleared him ab initio. See 61 SOL. JOUR. 573;
Sheppard, op. Cit., 285; Re Wimperis [1914] 1 Ch. 502. For both views see
61 SOT- JouR. 573, 588, 6o8, 627, 642; 33 L. QuAR. R v. 132, 254.
"Tiffany, op. cit., sec. 146; Jarman, op. cit., 718-719; Perkins, op. cit., sec. 567;
Co. Lit. 2.98a. For example, in a devise to A, a monk, for life, remainder to B
in fee, the remainder was good although A's estate was void.8 Perkins, op. cit., sec. 569; Archbishop Cranner's case, (1572, K. B.) 3 Dyer,
3o9a; .ull v. Jacob (1876) L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 703; see American cases, note 13
infra. E. g., a devise to A for life, remainder to B in fee; A disclaims; B's
remainder is accelerated.
"Perkins, op. cit., sec. 566; see note 4 supra. E.g., a devise or grant to A
for life, remainder to B, a monk, for life, remainder to C; A dies; C's estate
is accelerated.
COMMENTS
The doctrine of seisin did not have the same effect in cases involving
equitable estates. The legal estate was vested in the feoffee to uses;
so the feudal desideratum, a person to perform the required services,
was not wanting.'0 There was no crying need of acceleration to save
the equitable remainder. As a result there grew up the doctrine that
where the limitation was by deed or will to trustees and the limitation
of a prior equitable particular estate was void, subsequent equitable
or legal remainders were not accelerated unless such acceleration was
necessary to carry out the clearly expressed intention of the grantor
or testator." Instead'there was a resulting use to the, grantor's or the
testator's heirs.1
2
The American cases seem to deal chiefly with devises. A vested
legal or equitable remainder is accelerated, following the common-law
rules, on the destruction of the prior particular estate, either by
disclaiming,"3 or by the death of the life tenant in the testator's life-
time." The widow sometimes throws into confusion the testator's
plan of disposition by renouncing a life interest given under the will
and electing to take her statutory dower rights. When the amount
" See, Farrar, op. cit., 32 L. QuA.. REv. 4oo.
' Carrick v. Errington, supra note 4; Lainson v. Lainson (1853, Ch.) i8 Beav.
I; Sidney v. Shelley (8,5, Ch.) ig Ves. 352; Fearne, Contingent Remainders
(ist Amer. ed. i8ig) 221, Butler's note; see Jarman, op. cit, 719.
'Lewin, Trusts (12th ed. 19II) 178; Jarman, op. cit., 7o4; Tiffany, op. cit.,
sec. ioi ; Sidney ;v. Shelley, supra. This case was a devise to trustees to uses
for 99 years, with limitations over. No uses were later mentioned in the will
and so the question arose over the disposition of the term. The Lord Chan-
cellor said: "I agree, a voluntary settlement must be taken as I find it. If it is
by deed, I must give it its legal effect; and cannot consider the intention in the
same ways as I could upon a will; but upon a marriage settlement this court
is to look at the contract, and upon the intention of the parties, and give the
beneficial interest so that the intention may be satisfied." The decision was
against the heir because of the expressed intention of the testator.
A deed operating under the Statute of Uses would not give rise to a resulting
use if there was consideration. See Lewin, op. cit., 164 (4). There probably
would be an acceleration of the remainder. See Co. Lit. 298a, 272a. In the
United States the doctrine of resulting uses never gained much strength even
in voluntary conveyances. See Tiffany, op. cit., sec. 107 (b).
'Hesseltine v. Partridge (192o) 236 Mass. 77, 127 N. E. 429, is a typical
example. The devise was of realty to A for life, remainder to B and C. A
retiounced and took her dower interest. B's and C's estates were accelerated.
Slocum v. Hagerman (i898) X76 Ill. 533, 52 N. E. 332; Parker v. Ross (1898)
69 N. H. 213, 45 At. 576; Adams v. Gillespie (i855) 55 N. C. 244 (gift of
personalty); Dean v. Hart (1878) 62 Ala. 3o8; In Re Rawlings (1891) 8I -Iowa,
7ol, 47 N. W. 992. See also Jarman, op. cit., 719, 720; Tiffany, op. cit., sec. 146.
accord.
"Morris v. Philips (IgIg) 287 Ill. 633, 122 N. E. 831. Here the devise was to
A's children subject to a life estate in A. A died before the testator, and it
was held that the children's remainder Was accelerated.
Thornton v. Thompson (19o8) 197 Mass. 273, 83 N. E. 88o; Lyford v.
McFetridge (1917) 228 Mass. 285, 117 N. E. 589 (both the testator and life tenant
were killed at the same time in an accident) accord.
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so taken exceeds the value of the life interest given under the will so
as to diminish the gifts limited to others after the termination of the
widow's life interest, specific legacies are !not accelerated at the
expense of a residuary legatee, but the balance of the estate remaining,
after the widow's statutory share is paid, is allowed to accumulate until
her death. 5 In a few jurisdictions the effect on the residuary legatee
of the widow's election is not taken into consideration and renunciation
is held to be the eqaivalent of death. 6  When all the legatees are
affected equally, the reason for not accelerating the subsequently limited
gifts fails, and acceleration takes place.' 7  Similarly, vested legacies
following a void'trust are advanced. 8
A contingent remainder by its very nature can never be accelerated.
Rearing in mind the fundamental rule that the intention of the test-
tator governs, when the persons who are to take cannot be identified
from the description in the will until the happening of some future
event, it follows that there cannot be acceleration without violating
the testator's expressed intention."
a' Sellick v. Sellick (1919) 207 Mich. 194, 173 N. W. 609; Hinkley v. House of
Refuge (1874) 40 Md. 461; Firth v. Denny (i86I, Mass.) 2 Allen, 468;
Holdren v. Holdren (1908) 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N. E. 537; Dale v. Bartley
(1877) 58 Ind. ioi; Jones v. Knappen (i8gi) 63 Vt. 391, 22 Atl. 630; Cotten
v. Fletcher (1914) 7y N. H. 216, go At. 51o; see i Woerner, Administration
(2d ed. 1899) sec. ig.
I'Coover's Appeal (1873) 74 Pa. 143; In Re Schultz (1897) 113 Mich. 592,
71 N. W. iO79 (overruled by Sellick v. Sellick, supra, as regards the point in
discussion); In Re Ferguson's Appeal- (i8go) 138 Pa. 2o8, 2o At. 945; Trustees
of Church Home v. Morris (1896) 99 Ky. 317, 36 S. W. - (this case was decided
on the ground that the primary objects of the testator's bounty were the specific
legatees, and so acceleration was granted despite the injury to the residuary
legatee). See Woerner, loc. cit.
.Randall v. Randall (1897) 85 Md. 430, 37 Atl. 2o9; Parker v. Ross (I897)
69 N. H. 213, 45 At. 576; Fox v. Rumery (1878) 68 Me. 121; Robinson v.
Harrison (1874) 2 Tenn. Ch. ii.
' In a devise to trustees for five years, and then over to cnaritable institutions,
where the trust was void under the New York statute, it was held that the
remainder could be accelerated, as it was vested. In re Hitchcock (1917) .222
N. Y. 57, 118 N. E. 22o. But those gifts which are to be paid out of the trust
are void, though the gift over of the corpus of the estate is accelerated. In re
McQueens (1917, Surro.) 99 Misc. 185, 163 N. Y. Supp. 287; Maynard v.
Maynard (igig, Sup Ct.) IO8 Misc. 362, -178 N. Y. Supp. 329. See i Jarman,
op. cit., 723.
If the remainders are contingent after a void trust, they canno be accelerated
and fall with the trust In re Silsby (192o) 229 N. Y. 396, 128 N. E. 212. Cf.
Thistle's Estate (igig) 263 Pa. 6o, io6 Atl. 94"(contingent remainders depen-
dent upon a void accumulation clause).
"9 In a yecent Kentucky case the limitations of a devise were to trustees to
pay the income to the testator's wife for life, and after her death to B and C
equally and the whole income to the survivor, then to convert the whole estate
into cash and divide it among the then living descendants of C per stirpes.
The wife and B died. C was about seventy years old and wished to release to
COMMENTS
There remains to be considered the question of accelerating a vested
remainder preceded by an intervening contingent remainder.
2 0  At
common law upon the failure of the particular estate the contingent
remainder was destroyed unless saved by a trust,2' but modem statutes
generally render it indestructible. 22  The question now arises, under
the statute, as to who is entitled to the rents and profits during the
interim, as between the heir of the testator or the grantor and the
holder of the next vested estate. In the case of equitable limitations
there is little difficulty in applying the common-law rules,23 and, where
it clearly appears to be the intention of the testator or grantor to
disinherit his heirs, the remainder is accelerated, subject to a shifting
use if the contingent remainder should vest. This view has been
adopted by two recent English cases. 24  The doctrine of seisin inter-
feres in the case of legal remainders. For the seisin, once vested in
the remainderman, cannot be taken back, or in other words, there can
be no shiftirig legal estate at common law.25  A relic of feudalism,
his children. One child refused to join. It was held that the remainders were
contingent, as the persons described could not be identified until C died, and there
could be no acceleration. Keeton v. Tipton (igig) 184 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 09.
See also Page v. Rouss (192o, W. Va.) 1o3 S. E. 289; Compton v. Rixeys (i919)
124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651; Blatchford v. Newberry (i88o) 99 Ill. ii (good
collection of early authority) ; Toombs v. Spratlin (igo7) x27 Ga. 766, 57 S. E.
s9; Swann v. Austell (igi, C. C. A. 5th) 261 Fed. 465; Miller v. Miller (1913)
9I Kan., 136 Pac. 953 (conveyance by deed).
In O'Rear v. Bogie (1914) 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. I107, which seems to hold
that a contingent remainder may be accelerated, it is to be noted that the contin-
gent remainderman and the heir on whom the estate would have fallen in the
event of the court declaring an intestacy were the same person.
"Limitations to trustees in fee upon trust for A for life, remainder to A's
first and other sons in tail, remainder to B and C successively for life, remainder
over. A disclaimed. The contingent remainders to A's sons were preserved
by statute. The question is who is entitled to the rents and profits until the
vesting of the contingent remainder. In re Willis 11917] I Ch. 365. See
Jarman, op. cit., 719, 953; Co. Lit. 55 b, n. 8.
'See Gray, op. cit., sec. io, Tiffany, op. cit., sec. i4o.
" See Tiffany, op. cit., secs. 177, 178.
' See notes ii and 12 supra.
"
4In Re Conyngham [192o] 2 Ch. 495 (where the gift was revoked by a
codicil in the will) ; In re Willis, supra note 2o.
This is really treating the contingent remainder preserved by statute as an
executory limitation and applying the common-law rules. See Saunders, Uses
and Trusts (2d Amer. ed. 1850) 358. It is again a question of the intention
of the testator. Cf. In Re Townsend's Estate (1886) L. R. 34 Ch. Div. 357.
'In Re Scott [19Ii] 2 Ch. 374. A devise to thei use of A for life, remainder to
his first and other sons in tail, remainder to B, remainder.over. A disclaimed.
The contingent remainders were saved by statute. It was held that B's interest
was not accelerated. The decision was based on Carrick v. Errington, supra
note 4. In that case, however, if the trustees', estate had passed to the remainder:-
man, the contingent remainders would have failed and the very object of the
trust would have been defeated. The difficulty in applying the same rules to legal
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this need of a definite person to respond to the call for feudal services,
is the reason for this distinction, though why the remainderman will
not serve this present fictitious purpose as well as the heir is not quite
dear. Clearly a contingent remainder, preserved after the particular
estate is destroyed, has much the same character as an executory
limitation. The common-law theory of seisin has already been modified
to a great extent to meet the exigencies of mo.dern conditions.26 It
would not be doing any great violence to this moribund doctrine to
permit such legal renmainders to be accelerated subject to the executory
contingent remainder, provided it was the intention of the testator to
disinherit his heir.
ADMISSIBILITY OF INCOME TAX RETURN TO PROVE EARNING CAPACITY
The recent case of Veach's Adm'r v. Louisville Ry. (1921, Ky.) 228
S. W. 35, raises the interesting question whether an income tax return
is admissible in evidence to prove the earning capacity of a decedent.
In this case the administrator sued for the wrongful death of his
intestate, and, to prove her earning capacity, offered a certified income
tax return made shortly prior to her death. The court excluded the
evidence on the ground that it was a self-serving declaration. The
court argued that, since the tendency-is to make the tax as small as
possible, the return is a declaration in the interest of the declarant.
Regarded in this aspect, an absolutely bona fide statement, although
neutral, is also inadmissible, since only declarations against interest are
recognized as exceptions to the hearsay rule.1 But when A makes an
income tax return, he at once subjects himself to a pecuniary liability
to the government proportional to his admitted income. In this aspect
the return is against interest.2  Where a declaration has two aspects, it
is competent in so far as it tends to prove the matter against interest.3
The recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule are based upon
necessity and trustworthiness.' In the instant case the necessity exists,
limitations as govern equitable limitations, is the conception of seisin which
prevented an executory use at common law. The freehold had to pass out of
the grantor. If it passed to a vested remainder limited after a contingent
remainder, then the contingent remainder was extinguished. Fearne, op. cit.,
281.
'Finch, Seisin (919) 4 CORN. L. QuA. L1Page v. Cave (192c, Vt.) IIi At. 398; Chiles v. Bowyer (I92o, Va.) 1O3
S. E. 61g.
'Wigmore, Evidence (3904) secs. 1461, 1463; Humes v. O'Bryan & Wash-
ington (1883) 74 Ala. 79. For the purposes for-which the income tax return
is made, it is against the declarant's interest to admit that he has any income
beyond the amount that is exempt from the tax. A return showing no income
subject to tax would not be against i1iterest.
'Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 1458.
'Wigmore, op. cit., secs, i42i, 422.
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since the declarant is dead. Also there is a guaranty of trustworthi-
ness, because the return is made under oath, and the penalty for
dishonesty is so heavy that the gain is hardly worth the chance. Thus,
since it appears that the return is against interest, and since it fulfills
the requirements of necessity and trustworthiness, it would seem that
the return' should not have been excluded as incompetent.
Another question involved here, however, is one of relevancy.
Damages are assessed in part according to the pecuniary loss to an
estate by. reason of injury or death, and this loss is determined by
ascertaining the earning capacity of the injured or deceased party.5 If
the income of a party falls solely under the classification of salaries,
wages, fees, and commissions, then the return clearly shows the earning
capacity and is relevant. 6 Where, however, part of the income is
derived from investments, then only that part of the return relating to
earning capacity is relevant, and only that part should go to the jury.
When the income is classified under the head "earnings," and is derived
from funning a store, as in the instant case, the income from invest-
ments is not separated from income from personal services. The return
then furnishes the jury with no. information from which to determine
earning capacity unless the amount of the investment is ascertained
and the profit derived from this is subtracted from the total income.
In the instant case it seems that the court should have excluded the
evidence, but not for the reason given.
OVERLOOKING STATUTES
In an appeal recently argued before the House of Lords, a statute
which might have had a considerable bearing upon the case was entirely
overlooked in the lower court. Nor was it discovered until the appellate
court came across it in considering the decision. Notice was given
that a further argument of the appeal was desired and the Lord
Chancellor, in addressing counsel, said:
"It is not possible in the ordinary course for their Lordships to be
aware of all the authorities, statutory and otherwise, which might be
relevant to the issues in the particular case. Their Lordships are in
the hands of counsel and those that instruct counsel, and it is the
practice of the House to expect, and even to insist, that authorities
that bear one way or another upon matters in debate, shall be brought
by counsel to their attention."
Glebe Sugar Refining Co. v. Trustees of Greenock [1921] W. N.
86I.
This incident raises the interesting question as to what should be
the procedure when a statute, material to the issue, or controlling it, is
'See Patterson v. Williams (192o, Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 89; L. R. A.
1918 E, 28o, note
'See Montgomery, Excess Profits Tax Procedure (1921) 514.
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entirely overlooked. Professional ethics require that counsel make a
thorough and diligent search for all the authorities in point. The
fact that there are few cases in the books where statutes have been
completely overlooked is a tribute to the diligence that is usually
exercised. But even an attorney is not infallible and the presumption
that he knows all the law is an unfair one. A thorough knowledge of
the law is the working tool of every able lawyer. Likewise, it is the
chief qualification of the judge on the bench. The court is bound to
take judicial notice of the laws of its jurisdiction,' and, even though
these laws are not specially pleaded or are not mentioned in the course
of trial, yet the court, using them as a part of its legal equipment, may
nevertheless give them consideration in determining the case.
There is a general rule, not consistently followed, that points not
raised in the trial court cannot be urged on appeal. Thus a failure to
offer the statute of frauds as a defense in the lower court makes it
impossible to use it on appeal. 2 The same rule has been applied to the
statute of limitations.3 In both of these classes of cases the statute
offered a good defence, but one of such a nature that the parties could
waive it without doing an injustice. It has been held that a claim of
unconstitutionality must be made in the trial court.4  The issue of
public policy may, however, be raised for the first time-on appeal,5 and
this must necessarily be so, for the appellate court is presumably the
determining agency of the law of the state. In cases recently arising
in Massachusetts and Alabama where statutes required motor vehicles
and operators to be licensed and the courts had held that the failure to
be so licensed made the parties trespassers unlawfully upon the road,
the appellate court refused to consider these statutes for the. first time
on appeal.8 Here the statutes were positive in their nature, concerned
the substantive rights of the parties, and were the law of the jurisdiction.
The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues, and, had the appellate
courts considered these statutes on appeal; the cases would have been
decided upon an entirely different theory upon which no evidence had
14 Wigmore, Evidence (igo5) secs. 2572, 2573.
'Goldman v. Cohen (1915) 167 App. Div. 666, 153 N. Y. Supp. 41; Armstrong
v. Barceloux (I917) 34 Calif. App. 433, 167 Pac. 895 ; Kendall v. Metroz (1918)
65 Colo. 387, I76 Pac. 473; Bennett v. Denton (1917) 194 Mich. 61o, ioi N. W.
831; U. S. Rubber Co. v. Silverstein (192o) 229 N. Y. I68, 128 N. E. 123.
ICubit z. Jackson (1917, Tex.) 194 S. W. 594; Vazio v. Zimmer (gig, Mo.)
209 S. W. 9o9. Dworkin v. Caledonian'Ins. Co. (ig7, Mo.) 191 S.-W. x092..
'State, ex rel. Jones, v. Howe Scale Co. (1913) 253 Mo. 63, 161 S. W. 789.
'Ellis v. Frawley (1917) 165 Wis. 381, 161 N. W. 364; Daucet v. Mass. Bonding
& Ins. Co.- (1917) i8o App. Div. 599, 167 N. Y. Supp. 892. But see Boston Piano
Co. v. Pontiac Clothing Co. (1917) x99 Mich. 141, 165 N. W. 856. In this case
the contract in question was like those already considered and held illegal in two
cases previously decided in the same court. 'Yet the illegality, not having been
urged in this case in the trial court, could not be considered on appeal.
'Littlefield v. Gilman (1911) 207 Mass. 539, 93 N. E. 809; Atlantic Coast Line
v. Kelly (1918) 16 Ala. App. 360, 77 So. 972.
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been received under the pleadings in the lower court. It has been held
that a state court is not bound to take judicial notice of a ruling of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the failure to plead such a
ruling in the trial court precluded its consideration on appeal.7 There
has been a suggestion in some of the cases that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act cannot be urged for the first time in the appellate court,
but these cases apparently turn on the point that sufficient facts were
not pleaded below to bring the case within the statute.
8
The question of overlooking statutes -has been given sensible and
consistent treatment in Connecticut. In Cunningham v. Cunningham9 a
statute giving a deserted wife a right of action to secure an order for
support was entirely overlooked by the trial court, as was a statute
governing a rule of procedure in Salewski v. The Waterbury Manu-
facturing Co.10 . But in both cases the appellate court considered the
statutes. In the case of Schmidt v. Manchester" the question was as to
the sufficiency of a notice of defect in a highway and the trial court
entirely overlooked a statute, which, upon appeal, was held to be
determinative of the case. In all of these cases the substantive rights
of the parties would have been materially affected had the statutes not
been considered. But the point, in each case, was raised below,
although no mention was made of the statutory authority, so that the
appellee was not deprived of any defence that he did not have in the
trial court.
The trial of a cause is not a game but a search for truth and justice,
and it is submitted that an appellate court should consider any statutory
authority maiterial to the issue, whether or not it was raised in the
trial court. The failure to mention a statute may well be held to
operate as a waiver in those cases where the interests of the public
are not directly involved and where an express waiver would be held
operative. In general, statutes are "the law- of the land" which courts
are bound to apply. Errors arising from ignorance of a statute should
be corrected on appeal and a new trial granted if necessary in order to
secure a proper presentation of the facts in the light of the statute.
2
'Banaka v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (igio) 193 Mo. App. 345, 186 S. W. 7; Keeney v.
Chic., B., & Q. Ry. (I918) 183 Iowa, 522, 167 N. W. 475.8 Rogers v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. (1916) ii App. Div. 385, 157 N. Y. Supp. 83;
Ford v. Dickinson (i919, Mo.) 217 S. W. 294. The better rule seems to be that
the state courts are bound to take judicial notice of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, and that it need not be pleaded, but that it is merely necessary to
state sufficient facts to bring the case within the act. 47 L. R. A. (N. s.) 75,
note; L. R. A. I95 C, 78, note.
(1899) 72 Conn. 157, 44 Atl. 41.
0(1914) 89 Conn. 46, 92 Atl. 682.
(1918) 92 Conn. 551, 103 Atl. 654.
'Fourth Nat. Bank v. Franklyn (i886) 120 U. S. 747, 751, 7 Sup. Ct. 757, 759;
see Hart v. Adair (917, C. C. A. 9th) 244 Fed. 897.
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When a court sua sponte dismisses a case on a doubt as to itsjurisdiction, there ought to be plausible ground justifying the doubt.
The'Circuit Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in the case of Garvan
v. Kogler, March Term, 192i, No. 2863, has recently dismissed a com-
plaint for debt, brought under section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, of a resident of the United States against the Alien Property Cus-
todian, appearing on 'behalf of a German non-resident debtor, on the
ground that it did not appear clearly to the court that the plaintiff was
not an "enemy or ally of enemy." Between the parties there was no
such issue, and it was not apparently raised at -the trial. This was
doubtless due to the fact that section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy
Act (4o Stat. at L. 411, 419) expressly excludes residents of the United
States (except internees under Presidential proclamation) from the
category of "enemy." The court seems to have confused citizenship
with domicil, the test of enemy character under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, and to 'have been unfamiliar with section 2, which seems
to settle any doubt it might have had. When an appellate court adopts
the unusual practice of dismissing a complaint sua sponte for want ofjurisdiction it should' have some slight legal justification.
